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Perceived ability and actual recognition accuracy  
for unfamiliar and famous faces
Markus Bindemann1*, Janice Attard1 and Robert A. Johnston1 
Abstract: In forensic person recognition tasks, mistakes in the identification of  
unfamiliar faces occur frequently. This study explored whether these errors might 
arise because observers are poor at judging their ability to recognize unfamiliar faces, 
and also whether they might conflate the recognition of familiar and unfamiliar 
faces. Across two experiments, we found that observers could predict their ability to 
recognize famous but not unfamiliar faces. Moreover, observers seemed to partially 
conflate these abilities by adjusting ability judgements for famous faces after a test 
of unfamiliar face recognition (Experiment 1) and vice versa (Experiment 2). These 
findings suggest that observers have limited insight into their ability to identify  
unfamiliar faces. These experiments also show that judgements of recognition  
abilities are malleable and can generalize across different face categories.
Subjects: Behavioral Neuroscience; Cognitive Psychology; Perception; Psychological  
Science; Visual Cognition; Visual Perception
Keywords: face recognition; familiar; unfamiliar; beliefs; overgeneralization
1. Introduction
Person identification routinely involves unfamiliar faces. This is important in applied settings. 
Eyewitnesses, for example, might observe an unknown perpetrator at a crime scene and may later 
attempt to identify this person in police investigations (Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006; Wells & 
Olsen, 2003). And security tasks such as passport control require the matching of a face photograph 
from an identity document to its bearer (Jenkins & Burton, 2008; Johnston & Bindemann, 2013). 
There is considerable evidence that person identification in these tasks is highly error-prone. In the 
eyewitness domain, for example, correct identifications are typically made only on between 60 and 
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80% of trials under optimized experimental conditions (see, e.g. Bruce et al., 1999; Megreya & Burton, 
2008; Shapiro & Penrod, 1986). Identification accuracy can be lower still outside the laboratory. For 
example, a recent evaluation of police investigations in the UK showed that mistaken identifications 
of innocent line-up members occur in 41% of cases (Memon, Havard, Clifford, Gabbert, & Watt, 
2011). A similar pattern has been found with face matching tasks (Johnston & Bindemann, 2013). 
Under optimized conditions, identification errors are made on 10–20% of trials (e.g. Bindemann, 
Avetisyan, & Blackwell, 2010; Bindemann, Avetisyan, & Rakow, 2012; Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010). 
Performance declines further when the to-be-compared photographs are taken months apart 
(Megreya, Sandford, & Burton, 2013), picture quality is degraded (Bindemann, Attard, Leach, & 
Johnston, 2013) or realistic identity documents are used (Bindemann & Sandford, 2011; Kemp, 
Towell, & Pike, 1997).
The source of these errors is now well understood. With limited familiarity, observers can only 
have an incomplete idea of how a particular face looks. This representation is tied to the circum-
stances in which the person was viewed and is therefore instance-bound (see, e.g. Burton, Jenkins, 
& Schweinberger, 2011; Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000; Johnston & Edmonds, 2009). When further 
changes occur in the appearance of a face, for example, through variation in lighting (Longmore, Liu, 
& Young, 2008), expression (Bruce, 1982), or age (Megreya et al., 2013), it becomes increasingly 
difficult to associate this with the initial encounter of the same person.
This theoretical framework might explain why the identification of unfamiliar faces can be difficult. 
However, the existing evidence cannot account for why observers continue to make identification 
errors despite the difficulty of this task. For example, such errors could be avoided in experiments 
and real-life incidents by making “target absent” or “don’t know” responses. However, observers 
persist in making identification errors even when such response options are available (see, e.g. Bruce 
et al., 1999; Megreya & Burton, 2008; Memon et al., 2011; Weber & Perfect, 2012). The challenge of 
understanding the cause of these errors in applied settings, therefore, not only requires awareness 
of the extraneous factors that make unfamiliar face processing difficult (e.g. lighting, expression and 
age), but needs to explain why observers are willing to make incorrect identifications.
A potential explanation for this behaviour could be that observers are poor at judging their own 
ability to identify unfamiliar faces. This explanation is appealing considering that observers rarely 
receive feedback for identification. Consider an encounter with a person whom we have met only 
briefly before. If we fail to recognize this person in a subsequent encounter then there is no reason 
to assume that they have already been met. Consequently, without any corrective feedback, our 
inability to recognize unfamiliar faces might remain unchallenged. The absence of such challenges 
could sustain a belief that unfamiliar face identification is generally accurate. In line with this 
reasoning, it is notable that laboratory experiments on unfamiliar face identification typically do not 
provide feedback for accuracy. Thus, observers might be unaware of their poor performance in these 
tasks. In turn, when such feedback is provided, clear performance benefits are found (Alenezi & 
Bindemann, 2013; White, Kemp, Jenkins, & Burton, 2014).
In the absence of corrective feedback for unfamiliar face identification, observers might also draw 
on other sources to inform judgements of their identification ability. One possibility is that they 
overgeneralize their ability to recognize familiar faces, of family members, acquaintances, or famous 
people, to situations in which unfamiliar faces need to be identified (see Burton, 2013; Burton & 
Jenkins, 2011; Jenkins & Burton, 2011). Such familiar face recognition appears to be qualitatively 
different from the identification of unfamiliar faces (Megreya & Burton, 2006) and much more robust 
(see, e.g. Bahrick, Bahrick, & Wittlinger, 1975; Bruce, 1982; Burton, Wilson, Cowan, & Bruce, 1999). If 
observers are prone to confounding these processes, then this might, therefore, also affect ability 
judgements for unfamiliar faces. This possibility, that we might overgeneralize our ability to recognize 
familiar faces to their unfamiliar counterparts, has also been put forward as a potential explanation 
for errors in forensic person identification (Burton & Jenkins, 2011; Jenkins & Burton, 2011) but has not 
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2. Experiment 1
The aims of this experiment were twofold. Firstly, we sought to examine whether observers can 
predict their ability to recognize unfamiliar faces. For this purpose, we first asked observers to judge 
their abilities to recognize unfamiliar faces. We then tested the recognition of unfamiliar faces to 
determine whether a priori ability judgements predict task performance. In this test, participants 
attempted to select face targets from subsequent identity line-ups in an established laboratory test 
of unfamiliar face recognition (Bruce et al., 1999).
As we anticipated the relationship between perceived ability and task accuracy to be poor prior to 
the face test, it was important to assess whether observers can refine their ability judgements after 
feedback for performance has been provided. To explore this possibility, the difficulty of this test was 
manipulated by presenting the same face image as the initial target in the corresponding line-up, in 
the same-image condition, or by using two different images of the same identity for the initial target 
and its counterpart in the line-up in a more difficult different-image condition (see, e.g. Bruce, 1982; 
Jenkins & Burton, 2011; Longmore et al., 2008). These conditions were designed to induce a feeling 
of competence in unfamiliar face recognition in the same-image condition or of relative incompe-
tence in the different-image condition. We then measured whether feedback for these different face 
conditions exerted distinct effects on subsequent judgements of face recognition ability. If such 
effects can be found, then observers should rate their face recognition ability more highly in the 
comparatively easy same-image condition than the different-image condition.
We also recorded ability judgements for family members and famous people prior to and after the 
face test to explore whether observers would conflate the recognition of these categories with that 
of unfamiliar faces. If this is the case, then ability judgements for these different categories should 
correlate prior to the face test. In addition, feedback for the unfamiliar face test should not only 




Sixty undergraduate students (40 female) in the School of Psychology at the University of Kent, with 
a mean age of 21  years (range  =  18 to 34), participated in the experiment for course credit. All 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
3.2. Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of a questionnaire and a recognition test. The questionnaire comprised four 
questions to assess observers’ judgements of their perceived ability for recognizing family, famous 
and unfamiliar faces (How good do you think you are at recognizing the faces of your family/famous 
people/unfamiliar faces that you have only seen once before/unfamiliar faces that you have seen 
several times?). In response to these questions, participants rated their ability from “very bad” to 
“very good” on seven-point Likert scales.
The stimuli for the recognition test consisted of 40 trials of a line-up task. On each trial of this task, 
a single unfamiliar target face was presented in the screen centre and was followed by an identity 
line-up of 10 faces. The target and line-up faces were shown in greyscale on a white background, 
with a neutral expression, and in a frontal view. Each face image measured approximately 
7 cm × 6.5 cm. The target face was present in half of the identity line-ups (20 trials) and absent in the 
others (20 trials). In addition, on target-present trials, either an identical face image was used for 
the initial target and for the corresponding image in the identity line-up, to create the same-image 
condition, or two separate images were used for the different-image condition (for more information, 
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3.3. Procedure
Participants were administered the questionnaire to rate their recognition abilities for familiar and 
unfamiliar faces. They were then allocated randomly to one of the two face recognition tests, which were 
displayed on a desktop computer. Each trial began with a 1-s fixation cross, which was followed by a face 
target. Observers were asked to study the targets until they felt that they could identify them from a 
subsequent line-up. The target faces were then replaced with an identity line-up which was displayed 
until a response was made. Participants were asked to decide whether the target is present in the line-up, 
and if so, to press the corresponding number key on a standard computer keyboard (e.g. “1” for face 1) 
or to press “A” if the target was absent. In the same-image condition, participants were advised that the 
identical image to the target face would be present in the corresponding line-up. Similarly, in the differ-
ent-image condition, participants were informed that two different images of the same person would be 
used for the initial target and its counterpart in the subsequent line-up. In this way, each participant 
completed 20 target-present and 20 target-absent trials in a random order.
On completion of these tasks, participants were given on-screen feedback for their performance 
in the form of the percentage correct responses. In addition, participants in the same-image condi-
tion were told that they had performed very well in the recognition task, whereas participants in the 
different-image condition were told that they had not performed well. This feedback was adminis-
tered to further strengthen participants’ belief in their respective recognition abilities, as generated 
by the face tests. The questionnaire was then completed again.
4. Results
4.1. A priori ability judgements
In a first step of the analysis, observers’ a priori ability ratings were analysed for each of the 
questionnaire items. The aim of this analysis was to explore whether observers would conflate the 
recognition of these categories. If so, then ability ratings should correlate for familiar (family and 
famous) and unfamiliar faces.
The data shows that these ratings were close to ceiling for family faces (M = 6.53, SD = 0.75), and 
were also higher for famous faces (M = 5.30, SD = 1.15) than unfamiliar faces that have been seen 
several times (M = 5.00, SD = 0.96) or only once (M = 4.03, SD = 1.18). The overall pattern of these 
ratings, therefore, corresponds to the relative familiarity of the different face categories. Of greater 
interest was whether these judgements would correlate across different face categories. Ability 
judgements for family faces correlated with famous faces, r(58) = 0.322, p < 0.05, but not with 
unfamiliar-seen-once faces, r(58)  =  0.191, p  =  0.143, and unfamiliar-seen-several-times faces, 
r(58) = 0.166, p = 0.205. By contrast, ability judgements for unfamiliar-seen-once and seen-several-
times faces correlated strongly, r(58)  =  0.646, p  <  0.001. A correlation between famous and 
unfamiliar-seen-once faces was not found, r(58)  =  0.242, p  =  0.063, but ability judgements for 
famous faces also correlated with unfamiliar-seen-several-times faces, r(58)  =  0.292, p  <  0.05. 
Taken together, these results suggest that observers tend to associate their abilities to recognize 
familiar and unfamiliar faces to some extent, particularly for famous faces and unfamiliar faces 
that have been seen several times. For a summary of all correlations, see Table 1.
Table 1. Correlations of a priori ability judgements for family, famous and unfamiliar faces in 
Experiment 1
  Family Famous Unfamiliar—Once Unfamiliar—Several
Family – r = 0.322, p = 0.012 r = 0.191, p = 0.143 r = 0.166, p = 0.205
Famous * – r = 0.242, p = 0.063 r = 0.292, p = 0.024
Unfamiliar—Once n.s. n.s. – r = 0.646, p = 0.000
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4.2. A priori ability judgements and face recognition accuracy
The next step of the analysis explored the extent to which ability judgements predict performance on 
the face test. Specifically, we sought to examine whether such judgements to unfamiliar faces would 
correlate with recognition accuracy on the face test. For this purpose, we first analysed performance 
for the line-up tasks. This was calculated for target-present (correct identifications of the target) and 
target-absent trials (correct rejections of the line-up). In the same-image condition, 90.7% correct 
identifications (SD = 9.4) and 83.2% correct rejections (SD = 17.1) were recorded, compared to 58.3% 
correct identifications (SD = 17.9) and 59.7% correct rejections (SD = 25.4) for different-image trials. A 
2 (same-image versus different-image condition)  ×  2 (correct identifications, correct rejections) 
ANOVA of this data showed a main effect of condition, F(1,58) = 73.57, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.56, due 
to higher accuracy in the same-image condition. A main effect of line-up type, F(1,58) = 0.80, p = 0.37, 
partial η2 = 0.01 and interaction were not found, F(1,58) = 1.65, p = 0.20, partial η2 = 0.03. The recognition 
test was, therefore, effective in manipulating the difficulty of this task.
We also recorded considerable individual differences on both versions of the line-up task. In the 
same-image condition, for example, individual performance ranged from 63 to 100% accuracy 
(means of correct identifications and rejections), and from 33 to 85% for the different-image line-up 
displays. Broad individual differences were also evident in the initial ability judgements. For unfamiliar 
faces-seen-once, for example, these ratings ranged from one to seven on the seven-point scale. 
Despite this variation, these ability ratings correlated poorly with performance on the face test. For 
example, judgements for unfamiliar-seen-once or seen-several-times faces did not correlate with 
correct line-up identifications or correct rejections in the different-image condition. And in the 
same-image condition, only one of these correlations, of judgements for faces-seen-once and 
correct rejections, approached significance (for a summary of all correlations, see Table 2). This 
pattern also persisted when these ratings were combined for the two face test conditions, which 
showed no correlation between ability ratings and correct identifications or correct rejections for 
unfamiliar faces seen once, r(58) = −0.219, p = 0.093 and r(58) = 0.186, p = 0.155, or seen several 
times, r(58)=−0.119, p  =  0.365 and r(58)  =  0.004, p  =  0.978. This indicates that observers were 
generally poor at predicting their actual ability to identify unfamiliar faces.
4.3. A posteriori ability judgements and face recognition accuracy
Considering that a priori ability ratings poorly predicted performance on the face test, it is important 
to establish whether such a relationship can be found at all. For this purpose, ability judgements 
Table 2. Correlations of ability judgements and recognition accuracy in Experiment 1, prior to 
and after the face test










Family r = 0.217, p = 0.248 r = −0.030, p = 0.876 r = 0.145, p = 0.445 r = 0.026, p = 0.890
Famous r = 0.288, p = 0.122 r = 0.016, p = 0.933 r = −0.043, p = 0.823 r = 0.261, p = 0.163
Unfamiliar—Once r = 0.109, p = 0.567 r = 0.359, p = 0.051 r = −0.310, p = 0.096 r = 0.259, p = 0.166
Unfamiliar—Several r = 0.051, p = 0.787 r = −0.215, p = 0.253 r = −0.210, p = 0.265 r = 0.133, p = 0.484
After face test
Family r = 0.081, p = 0.670 r = 0.243, p = 0.195 r = 0.025, p = 0.896 r = 0.206, p = 0.275
Famous r = 0.074, p = 0.697 r = 0.145, p = 0.444 r = 0.017, p = 0.927 r = 0.354, p = 0.055
Unfamiliar—Once r = 0.037, p = 0.846 r = 0.567, p = 0.001*** r = 0.128, p = 0.500 r = 0.327, p = 0.078
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were also compared with recognition performance after feedback had been provided. At this 
stage, ability judgements related to identification performance to some extent, as judgements 
for unfamiliar-seen-several-times faces correlated with correct rejections in the same-image, 
r(28) = 0.404, p < 0.05, and the different-image condition, r(28) = 0.486, p < 0.01. In addition, such a 
correlation was also found with ability judgements for unfamiliar-seen-once faces and same-image 
displays, r(28) = 0.567, p < 0.001. However, none of the analogous correlations with correct identifi-
cations was reliable (see Table 2). In contrast, both correct rejections and correct identifications 
correlated strongly with ability judgements for unfamiliar-seen-once and seen-several-times faces 
when the data from the same-image and different-image conditions was combined, all rs ≥ 0.558, 
all ps ≤ 0.001.
4.4. Change in ability ratings
Finally, to further assess whether observers tend to conflate the recognition of familiar and unfamiliar 
faces, we also explored the change in ability ratings prior to and after the face test more directly. 
Specifically, we sought to investigate whether the different conditions of the face test only affected a 
posteriori ability ratings for unfamiliar faces or whether this also influenced judgements to famous 
and family faces. For this analysis, we calculated the mean ratings for each of the questionnaire items 
(see Figure 1). These show that the face test did not affect observers’ ratings to process family 
faces but influenced ratings for famous and unfamiliar faces. In these categories, ability ratings were 
matched evenly in the same- and different-image conditions prior to the face test but increased 
thereafter in the former and declined in the latter.
A series of four 2 (condition: same-image, different-image) × 2 (time: before versus after the face 
test) ANOVAs for the questionnaire items did not show a main effect of time for unfamiliar-seen-
once faces, F(1,58)  =  1.45, p  =  0.23, partial η2  =  0.02, but a main effect of condition was found, 
F(1,58)  =  16.63, p  <  0.001, partial η2  =  0.22, and an interaction between factors, F(1,58)  =  52.01, 
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.47. Analysis of simple main effects showed that ratings were evenly matched 
Figure 1. Recognition ability 
ratings before and after 
the unfamiliar face test 
in Experiment 1 for family 
and famous faces, and for 
unfamiliar faces seen once and 
several times.
Notes: Solid line denotes 
same-image condition, 
dashed line denotes 
different-image condition. 
Vertical bars represent the 
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across conditions prior to the face test, F(1,58) = 1.05, p = 0.31, partial η2 = 0.01, but differed after-
wards, F(1,58) = 57.35, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.33, due to an improvement in the same-image condi-
tion, F(1,58)  =  18.06, p  <  0.001, partial η2  =  0.24, and a decline in the different-image condition, 
F(1,58) = 35.40, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.38.
A similar pattern was observed for ratings to unfamiliar-seen-several-times faces, which also 
showed a main effect of condition, F(1,58) = 18.59, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.24, and time, F(1,58) = 8.23, 
p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.12, and an interaction between factors, F(1,58) = 34.00, p < 0.001, partial 
η2  =  0.37. Once again, this interaction reflects the fact that ratings were evenly matched across 
conditions prior to the face test, F(1,58) = 0.05, p = 0.82, partial η2 = 0.00, but differed thereafter, 
F(1,58)  =  48.97, p  <  0.001, partial η2  =  0.30, due to an increase in the same-image condition, 
F(1,58)  =  4.39, p  <  0.05, partial η2  =  0.07, and the reverse effect in the different-image 
condition, F(1,58)  =  37.85, p  <  0.001, partial η2  =  0.40. These results, therefore, indicate that the 
recognition test influenced observers’ perception of their recognition ability for unfamiliar faces.
The same analysis was conducted for judgements for famous and family faces. For famous 
faces, ANOVA did not show a main effect of time, F(1,58) = 0.63, p = 0.43, partial η2 = 0.01, but of 
condition, F(1,58) = 4.55, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.07, and an interaction between factors, F(1,58) = 9.05, 
p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.14. Again, analysis of simple main effects showed that ratings were evenly 
matched across conditions prior to the face test, F(1,58) = 0.83, p = 0.37, partial η2 = 0.01, but differed 
thereafter, F(1,58)  =  9.42, p  <  0.01, partial η2  =  0.08, due to an improvement in the same-image 
condition, F(1,58) = 7.22, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.11. By contrast, performance was more comparable 
prior to and after the face test in the different-image condition, F(1,58) = 2.46, p = 0.12, partial η2 = 0.04.
The same analysis also revealed a main effect of condition for ability ratings for family faces, 
F(1,58) = 13.76, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.19, due to observers generally rating their recognition ability 
higher in the same-image condition. However, no main effect of time, F(1,58) = 0.53, p = 0.47, partial 
η2 = 0.01, and no interaction were found, F(1,58) = 0.20, p = 0.66, partial η2 = 0.03.
5. Discussion
This experiment showed that observers’ judgement of their ability to process unfamiliar faces poorly 
predicts their accuracy in a recognition test for such faces. By contrast, such associations were found 
after participants had been given feedback for their recognition performance. This indicates that it is 
not generally impossible to find such correlations. Instead, these findings suggest that observers 
might not receive such feedback outside of the laboratory. As a consequence, observers might be 
poor initially at judging their own face recognition ability, with the possibility of improving awareness 
of ability after such feedback is provided. This notion is consistent with other recent studies, which 
have shown that feedback can enhance unfamiliar face identification (Alenezi & Bindemann, 2013; 
White et al., 2014).
We also investigated whether observers might conflate their ability judgements for unfamiliar 
faces with famous faces. We obtained some evidence for this, with an association in ability ratings 
between famous faces and unfamiliar-seen-several-times faces. In addition, observers also adjust-
ed judgements of their face identification ability after the recognition test. As expected, perfor-
mance was better in the same-image version of this test than the different-image condition, and 
observers subsequently rated their recognition abilities for unfamiliar faces according to the 
difficulty of these conditions. Remarkably, however, a similar pattern was also observed for famous 
faces. This provides additional evidence to suggest that observers conflate their abilities to recognize 
familiar and unfamiliar faces. These results therefore indicate that observers’ judgement of their 
face recognition ability is malleable and can be altered after only a short recognition test.
The findings of this experiment raise the question of whether observers are generally poor at 
predicting their face recognition performance or whether this is confined to unfamiliar faces. 
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performance for unfamiliar faces to inform judgements of their recognition ability for famous 
faces, or whether the reverse effect is also found. These questions were explored in a further 
experiment.
6. Experiment 2
Experiment 1 suggests that observers are poor at estimating their ability to recognize unfamiliar 
faces. Moreover, the difficulty of an unfamiliar face recognition test can affect observers’ judgement 
of their ability to recognize famous faces, which suggests that observers can conflate these 
processes. The next experiment sought to examine whether observers are also poor at predicting 
their ability to recognize familiar faces, and whether this relationship can be strengthened subse-
quently by providing feedback. Additionally, we examined whether performance from a recognition 
test for famous faces would, in turn, affect ability judgements for unfamiliar faces.
As in Experiment 1, observers’ beliefs about their face recognition abilities were assessed with a 
set of four questions. Participants were then shown “current” or “before they were famous” (BTWF) 
faces of famous people in a recognition test. The latter manipulation, of using photographs of 
famous individuals before they became widely known, typically when they were children or adoles-
cents, can be used to make the recognition of familiar faces more challenging (Russell, Duchaine, & 
Nakayama, 2009). Similar to the line-up tasks of Experiment 1, these conditions were designed to 
induce a feeling of competence in face recognition in the current condition or of relative incompe-
tence in the BTWF condition. Observers then rated their recognition abilities again to determine how 
these judgements were influenced by the recognition test.
7. Method
7.1. Participants
Sixty undergraduate students (51 female) in the School of Psychology at the University of Kent, with 
a mean age of 20 years (range = 18 to 25), participated in this experiment for course credit. None 
had participated in Experiment 1. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
7.2. Stimuli
Observers’ beliefs about their face recognition abilities were assessed with the same questionnaire 
as in Experiment 1, but the stimuli for the recognition test now consisted of photographs of 40 
famous faces (A name list of these famous people can be viewed in Appendix A). Each face was 
shown in a frontal view at a size of 7  ×  7  cm. Two photographs of each face were used, which 
consisted either of a recent photograph for the current condition or a photograph of the same 
person as a child or adolescent for the BTWF condition.
7.3. Procedure
Participants began the experiment by completing the questionnaire. They were then allocated 
randomly to one of the recognition tests, using current or BTWF faces. In both conditions, 
participants attempted to identify 40 famous people by name or a unique semantic description 
(e.g. a combination of nationality and occupation), which were displayed in a booklet at a rate of one 
face per page. An experimenter recorded participants’ responses.
Upon completion of the face test, participants were informed of their recognition performance (in 
% accuracy). In the current condition, participants were also told they had performed well, whereas 
in the BTWF condition they were told they had performed poorly. This feedback was administered to 
strengthen the impression of good or bad recognition competence that we aimed to generate with 
the face test. Participants then completed the questionnaire for a second time. Finally, a familiarity 
check was administered, which consisted of a list of the names of the famous faces. Participants 
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8. Results
8.1. A priori ability judgements
As in Experiment 1, a priori ability ratings were analysed first for each of the questionnaire items to 
explore whether observers conflate recognition of the different face categories. Once again, these 
ratings were close to ceiling for family faces (M = 6.58, SD = 0.65), and were higher for famous faces 
(M = 4.55, SD = 1.10) than unfamiliar faces that have been seen several times (M = 4.30, SD = 1.23) or 
only once (M = 3.42, SD = 1.37). Ability judgements did not correlate between family and famous faces, 
r(58) = 0.162, p = 0.217, family and unfamiliar-seen-once faces, r(58) = 0.066, p = 0.619, and family and 
unfamiliar-seen-several-times faces, r(58) = 0.204, p = 0.119. By contrast, ability judgements for unfa-
miliar faces that had only been seen once or several times correlated strongly, r(58) = 0.823, p < 0.001. 
In addition, ability judgements for famous faces correlated with unfamiliar-seen-several-times faces, 
r(58)  =  0.304, p  <  0.05, but a correlation between famous and unfamiliar-seen-once faces was not 
found, r(58) = 0.217, p = 0.095. As in Experiment 1, these results, therefore, suggest that observers 
associate their abilities to recognize familiar and unfamiliar faces, particularly famous faces and 
unfamiliar faces that have been seen several times. For a summary of these correlations, see Table 3.
8.2. A priori ability judgements and face recognition accuracy
We then sought to determine whether these ability judgements predict performance on the famous 
face recognition test. We first analysed recognition performance. This analysis only included faces 
that observers knew, as indicated by the familiarity check. This led to the exclusion of 8.7% of trials 
for the current condition and 7.7% for the BTWF condition. Recognition accuracy for the remaining 
trials was at 77.3% for the current condition (SD = 22.3) and 28.1% for the BTWF condition (SD = 13.4). 
An independent-samples t-test showed that this difference was reliable, t(58) = 10.36, p < 0.001, 
d = 2.68. This indicates that the conditions were effective in manipulating the difficulty of this task.
To determine whether observers could predict their recognition accuracy, ability judgements were 
then correlated with individual performance. This revealed reliable correlations between recognition 
accuracy and observers ability judgements to recognize famous faces in the current and the BTWF 
condition, r(28)  =  0.472, p  <  0.01 and r(28)  =  0.392, p  <  0.01, respectively. In contrast, ability 
Table 3. Correlations of a priori ability judgements for family, famous and unfamiliar faces in 
Experiment 2
Family Famous Unfamiliar—Once Unfamiliar—Several
Family – r = 0.162, p = 0.217 r = 0.066, p = 0.619 r = 0.204, p = 0.119
Famous n.s. – r = 0.217, p = 0.095 r = 0.304, p = 0.018
Unfamiliar—Once n.s. n.s. – r = 0.823, p = 0.000
Unfamiliar—Several n.s. * *** –
*p < 0.05.
 ***p < 0.001.
Table 4. Correlations of ability judgements and recognition accuracy in Experiment 2, prior to 
and after the face test
Before face test After face test
Current condition BTWF condition Current condition BTWF condition
Family r = 0.216, p = 0.252 r = 0.133, p = 0.485 r = 0.413, p = 0.023* r = 0.125, p = 0.509
Famous r = 0.472, p = 0.009** r = 0.392, p = 0.032* r = 0.796, p = 0.000*** r = 0.527, p = 0.003**
Unfamiliar—Once r = −0.018, p = 0.925 r = −0.157, p = 0.408 r = 0.101, p = 0.596 r = −0.127, p = 0.504
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judgements for family and unfamiliar faces did not relate to recognition performance, all rs ≤ 0.216, 
ps ≥ 0.252 (for a summary of all correlations, see Table 4). This pattern persisted when these ratings 
were combined for the current and BTWF conditions. This analysis also revealed a correlation 
between recognition accuracy and ability judgements for famous faces, r(58) = 0.274, p < 0.05, but 
not for family or unfamiliar faces, all rs ≤ 0.156, ps ≥ 0.232.
8.3. A posteriori ability judgements and face recognition accuracy
A similar pattern was obtained when the post-test ability judgements were compared with recognition 
accuracy. Once again, reliable correlations were found between accuracy and ability judgements to 
recognize famous faces in the current condition, r(28)  =  0.796, p  <  0.001, and the BTWF condition, 
r(28) = 0.527, p < 0.01. In addition, ability judgements for family faces also correlated with recognition 
accuracy in the current condition, r(28) = 0.413, p < 0.05. None of the other correlations reached signifi-
cance, all rs ≤ 0.127, ps ≥ 0.504 (for a summary of correlations, see Table 4). This pattern persisted when 
these ratings were combined for the current and BTWF conditions, which also showed a correlation 
between recognition accuracy and ability judgements for famous faces, r(58) = 0.880, p < 0.001. In 
addition, this analysis also revealed a correlation between recognition accuracy and ability judgements 
for family faces, r(58) = 0.255, p < 0.05, and unfamiliar faces seen-several-times, r(58) = 0.315, p < 0.05, 
but not for unfamiliar faces seen-once, r(58) = 0.229, p = 0.079.
8.4. Change in ability ratings
Once again, the questionnaire ratings before and after the face test were also compared directly to 
explore further whether observers tend to conflate the recognition of familiar and unfamiliar faces. 
The cross-subject means of these ratings are shown in Figure 2. All ratings were initially matched 
across the two conditions of the face test. In the current condition, these ratings also appear 
comparable prior to and after the administration of the face test. By contrast, participants reported 
a substantial drop in ability in the BTWF condition after the face test. This was most pronounced for 
famous faces but seems to generalize to unfamiliar faces.
Figure 2. Recognition ability 
ratings before and after the 
famous face test in Experiment 
2 for family and famous faces, 
and for unfamiliar faces seen 
once and several times.
Notes: Solid line denotes 
current condition, dashed 
line denotes BTWF condition. 
Vertical bars represent the 
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To analyse these changes, four 2 (condition: current, BTWF) × 2 (time: before versus after the 
face test) ANOVAs were conducted for the questionnaire items. For ratings for family faces, this 
analysis did not find a main effect of time, F(1,58) = 0.00, p = 1.00, partial η2 = 0.00, or condition, 
F(1,58)  =  0.73, p  =  0.40, partial η2  =  0.01, and no interaction between factors, F(1,58)  =  0.49, 
p < 0.49, partial η2 = 0.01. In contrast, main effects of condition, F(1,58) = 23.58, p < 0.001, partial 
η2  =  0.29, time, F(1,58)  =  60.65, p  <  0.001, partial η2  =  0.51, and an interaction were found for 
ratings for famous faces, F(1,58) = 100.98, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.64. Analysis of simple main 
effects showed that ability ratings were matched across conditions at the start of the experiment, 
F(1,58) = 0.01, p = 0.92, partial η2 = 0.00, but were lower in the BTWF than the current condition 
after the face test, F(1,58) = 75.29, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.39. Whereas ability ratings for famous 
faces were constant throughout the experiment in the current condition, F(1,58) = 2.56, p = 0.12, 
partial η2 = 0.04, they declined after the face test in the BTWF condition, F(1,58) = 159.07, p < 0.001, 
partial η2 = 0.73.
A similar pattern emerged with the remaining questionnaire items. For unfamiliar faces seen 
once, a main effect of condition was not observed, F(1,58) = 1.63, p = 0.21, partial η2 = 0.03, but a 
main effect of time, F(1,58)  =  11.67, p  <  0.01, partial η2  =  0.17, and an interaction were found, 
F(1,58) = 8.10, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.12. Analysis of simple main effects revealed comparable ability 
ratings across the face test conditions at the start of the experiment, F(1,58) = 0.08, p = 0.78, partial 
η2 = 0.00, but not after the administration of the face test, F(1,58) = 4.55, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.04. 
This reflects a decrease in ability ratings in the BTWF condition, F(1,58) = 19.60, p < 0.001, partial 
η2 = 0.25, whereas these ratings were matched evenly in the current condition prior to and after the 
face test, F(1,58) = 0.16, p = 0.68, partial η2 = 0.00.
Observers’ ratings for unfamiliar faces seen several times revealed an identical pattern. Again, 
a main effect of condition was not present, F(1,58) = 3.80, p = 0.06, partial η2 = 0.06, but a main 
effect of time, F(1,58)  =  29.96, p  <  0.01, partial η2  =  0.34, and an interaction were found, 
F(1,58) = 8.79, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.13. Ability ratings were matched across the current and BTWF 
conditions at the start of the experiment, F(1,58) = 0.17, p = 0.68, partial η2 = 0.00, but differed 
after the face test, F(1,58)  =  9.44, p  <  0.01, partial η2  =  0.08. This reflects a decrease in ability 
ratings in the BTWF condition, F(1,58) = 35.61, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.38, whereas these ratings 
were more comparable in the current condition prior to and after the face test, F(1,58) = 3.15, 
p = 0.08, partial η2 = 0.05.
9. Discussion
In this experiment, observers’ a priori ability ratings to recognize famous faces correlated with 
recognition accuracy for current and BTWF faces. This indicates that observers have some insight 
into their ability to process familiar faces that translates into actual recognition performance. In 
addition, however, this experiment also provides further evidence that observers tend to conflate 
their perceived abilities to process famous and unfamiliar faces. As in Experiment 1, a priori 
judgements of recognition abilities correlated for famous and unfamiliar-seen-several-times faces. 
In addition, the different conditions of the famous face recognition test not only affected subse-
quent ability judgements for famous faces, but also produced a knock-on effect for unfamiliar faces. 
This indicates that observers generalized their recognition performance for famous faces to inform 
judgements of their recognition ability for unfamiliar faces.
10. General discussion
While the identification of unfamiliar faces is a difficult task (see, e.g. Bruce et al., 1999; Johnston & 
Bindemann, 2013; Memon et al., 2011), it remains unresolved why observers are prone to making 
identification errors. This study investigated a potential explanation for this phenomenon, by 
assessing whether observers are poor at judging their own ability to identify unfamiliar faces. We 
also explored whether observers might conflate the recognition of familiar and unfamiliar faces, by 
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Experiment 1 showed that ability judgements poorly predicted performance in a test of unfamiliar 
face recognition. Indeed, only one correlation, between ability judgements and correct line-up rejec-
tions in the same-image condition, approached significance. This condition was included here to 
provide a comparatively easy version of the face test, and to manipulate observers’ perception of the 
difficulty of the task. Generally, however, the problem of unfamiliar face recognition in applied set-
tings is the recognition of different instances of the same face (for an illustration, see, e.g. Jenkins & 
Burton, 2011). The same-image condition, therefore, provides only a poor proxy to the actual prob-
lem of unfamiliar face identification. Consequently, the rather moderate, and only, correlation 
between a priori ability judgements and correct line-up rejections in the same-image condition is 
also of limited interest here.
Considering that a priori ability judgements predicted unfamiliar face identification poorly, it is 
noteworthy that stronger correlations were obtained after the recognition test in Experiment 1. 
Moreover, we also found that observers could predict their recognition performance for famous 
faces in Experiment 2. These findings indicate that the a priori ability judgements for unfamiliar face 
identification do not fail to relate to actual performance in Experiment 1 because such associations 
cannot be found generally. Instead, these findings suggest that observers initially had limited insight 
into aspects of recognition ability that relate specifically to unfamiliar faces.
A possible explanation for this finding is that we rarely receive feedback for errors in unfamiliar 
face identification outside of the laboratory. As a consequence, observers might be poor at judging 
their own recognition ability. This notion is consistent with other recent studies, which have shown 
that accuracy is higher in unfamiliar face matching when performance feedback is administered 
(Alenezi & Bindemann, 2013; White et al., 2014). We also suggest that the presence of such feedback 
for familiar faces outside of the laboratory could explain why observers could predict their perfor-
mance on the famous face recognition test. In social interaction, successful person identification is 
self-evident from the reaction of other people. Identification feedback for famous people might be 
even more explicit. Famous faces in the media are, for example, often accompanied by additional 
identity-related information, such as names and semantic information, to confirm recognition. If 
observers utilize this information to inform judgements of their own recognition ability, then one 
would expect to obtain a correlation between perceived and actual recognition ability for famous 
people (as in Experiment 2) but not for unfamiliar faces (as in Experiment 1).
Considering that observers should have a clearer notion of their ability to process famous than 
unfamiliar faces, we also wondered whether they might draw on the former to inform judgements of 
the latter. We obtained several lines of evidence for this. For example, while initial ability judgements 
did not correlate between famous and once-seen unfamiliar faces, they were associated with famous 
and unfamiliar-seen-several-times faces. While the identification of familiar faces appears to be 
qualitatively different from unfamiliar faces (Megreya & Burton, 2006), the correlation between these 
categories makes good sense when familiarity is viewed as a continuum. On this continuum, famous 
faces are not as familiar as family faces, whereas unfamiliar faces that have been seen several times 
are more familiar than once-seen unfamiliar faces. In the current experiments, famous and unfamil-
iar-seen-several-times faces, therefore, lie adjacent along the familiarity continuum and straddle the 
boundary between “familiar” and “unfamiliar” face recognition. We also note that initial ability judge-
ments for these face categories were similar in both experiments (e.g. at 5.3 and 5.0 in Experiment 1 
and 4.6 and 4.3 in Experiment 2 for famous and unfamiliar faces, respectively), which suggests 
further that observers might perceive their abilities to process these stimuli to be quite comparable.
A comparison of ability judgements prior to and after the recognition tests also indicates that 
observers tend to relate familiar and unfamiliar face recognition more generally. In both 
experiments, the face tests did not affect recognition ability ratings for family members, which were 
consistently close to ceiling. However, the unfamiliar face test influenced how observers viewed 
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ratings in the more difficult face test condition. Experiment 2 then revealed a similar pattern after an 
identification task for famous faces, whereby ability ratings were larger for unfamiliar faces after a 
relatively easy recognition test than in the more difficult condition.
While these changes in ability ratings indicate that observers tend to generalize the judgement of 
their recognition abilities across famous and unfamiliar faces, it is also notable that the largest 
changes in ability ratings were observed within face categories. This pattern converges with the 
correlations of the initial ability judgements for familiar and unfamiliar faces, which were present 
only for famous and unfamiliar-seen-several-times faces. Both sets of findings, therefore, suggest 
that observers conflate ability judgements for familiar and unfamiliar faces, but only do so 
partially.
We conducted these experiments to explore further why the identification of unfamiliar faces is so 
error-prone in experimental (e.g. Bruce et al., 1999; Burton et al., 2010; Megreya & Burton, 2006) and 
applied settings (e.g. Kemp et al., 1997; Memon et al., 2011). A range of factors have now been iden-
tified that can make this task difficult, but these focus primarily on extraneous influences that affect 
the appearance of a face. In addition, however, theories of unfamiliar face identification also need 
to explain why observers are willing to make (incorrect) identifications despite the difficulty of this 
task. The exploration of a priori ability ratings and their relationship with subsequent face recogni-
tion performance suggest that such errors might occur because observers have little insight into 
their own accuracy in this task. As a consequence, observers might be unaware of the likelihood that 
identification errors might be made and commit such mistakes more readily.
It is less clear from these data whether observers might also be prone to making identification 
errors because they overgeneralize their ability to process familiar faces to unfamiliar people. The 
current study revealed an association for a priori ability judgements to famous and unfamiliar-
seen-several-times faces in both experiments and showed also that observers conflate these 
processes to some extent when they are given performance feedback for only one of these tasks 
(i.e. unfamiliar face identification in Experiment 1 and famous face recognition in Experiment 2). 
However, while such an effect was found in the overall ability ratings (see Figures 1 and 2), it was 
only partially evident from correlations of the initial ratings for the different face categories, as 
this effect was not present for famous and unfamiliar-seen-once faces (see Tables 1 and 3). In 
addition, we also found that a priori ability judgements for famous faces do not relate directly to 
unfamiliar face identification accuracy (see Table 1). Thus, it is not simply the case that people 
who think they are good at recognizing familiar faces are also less (or more) prone to making 
errors in unfamiliar face identification. The current experiments, therefore, suggest that the 
relationship between familiar and unfamiliar face recognition is one of perceived ability rather 
than actual accuracy.
We draw these conclusions with some obvious caveats. The current experiments are, for example, 
dependent on the tests that were used to measure face recognition performance. It is conceivable 
that other tests might reveal stronger links between observers’ initial ability judgements and their 
recognition accuracy. Similarly, it is possible that better measures can be found to assess observers’ 
judgement of their face recognition abilities than the simple scales that we have devised here. We 
also note that feedback for task performance (i.e. % accuracy) and verbal feedback (e.g. “You have 
performed/not performed well in this task”) were confounded in the current study. Consequently, 
some participants might have perceived these feedback types to provide conflicting information, for 
example, when accuracy in the face test appears to be low but they are told to have done well.
As the feedback was provided specifically to induce a sense of relative competence or incompe-
tence in facial recognition, we adopted this combined feedback approach for several reasons. One of 
these is that observers could have no advance knowledge of the performance level that constitutes 



























Page 14 of 15
Bindemann et al., Cogent Psychology (2014), 1: 986903
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311908.2014.986903
contextual information, might therefore provide insufficient feedback to observers about their 
face-processing competence. The face conditions also varied in difficulty in both experiments and it 
was difficult to determine in advance whether a percentage score in one condition constitutes better 
performance than in the other. It is unclear, for example, whether an observer with an accuracy of 
70% in the more difficult different-image condition in Experiment 1 is better at face recognition than 
someone who achieves 80% in the easier same-image condition. For these reasons, we decided 
to supplement the percentage accuracy scores with verbal feedback for the questions under inves-
tigation here, and the results show that this combined approach was effective (see Figures 1 and 2). 
For future research, it would be interesting to determine which feedback type exerts greater 
influence on observers’ ability ratings.
Such investigations could also examine whether feedback influences observers’ beliefs about their 
face recognition abilities indirectly. It is possible, for example, that verbal feedback influences these 
beliefs via personality variables, such as failure-related action orientation, if negative feedback 
(e.g. “You have not performed well in this task”) evokes anxiety or agitation (see Kuhl, 1994a, 1994b). 
While these might be interesting avenues for further research, it is notable that limited research 
continues to exist in first place regarding the accuracy of observers’ judgement of their face 
perception abilities, both for familiar and unfamiliar faces. This is surprising given its potential 
applied value (e.g. for forensic identification tasks) and clinical relevance (e.g. for determining 
recognition impairments). Our study only provides a starting point here.
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Appendix A
A name list of the famous faces used in Experiment 2.
50 Cent Beyoncé Brad Pitt Britney Spears
Christina Aguilera Daniel Radcliffe David Beckham David Bowie
David Hasselhoff Eminem Enrique Iglesias George Clooney
George Michael Jennifer Aniston Johnny Depp Jude Law
Julia Roberts Kate Middleton Kate Moss Katy Perry
Keira Knightley Kelly Brook Kristen Stewart Kylie Minogue
Lady Gaga Leonardo DiCaprio Mariah Carey Meryl Streep
Nicole Kidman Owen Wilson Renée Zellweger Rihanna
Robbie Williams Robert Downey Jr Robin Williams Sarah Jessica Parker
Simon Cowell Snoop Dogg Uma Thurman Wayne Rooney
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